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Incentivizing Contrarianism — David Phelps

David Phelps is the co-founder of JokeDAO, a governance platform for decentralized, bottom-up governance. In a recent essay collaboration on Not Boring, David takes a stand against consensus in DAO governance. He argues that forking — more specifically, contrarian opinions — presents a more interesting opportunity for governance innovation. Jess and David touch briefly on the value of community curation, the complications of off-chain + on-chain coordination, and the persistent challenge of the attention economy.

Show Notes
& Relevant Links

David Resources:

Links & People Mentioned:
Notboring article
Packy Mccormick
The Great Online Game
Nouns DAO
Cosmos blockchain

Time - Stamps:

0:00 - Intro
1:17 - David
2:38 - What’s Wrong with DAO Governance Today
6:52 - Participation
14:03 - Models That Need to Evolve
21:29 - How To Surface More Information
34:16 - Building For Optionality
39:24 - Creating Spaces
45:11 - Insights From Nouns DAO
51:42 - Wrap Up


Jess Sloss 0:00
Welcome to club.

David Phelps 0:01
My pleasure to be here. Thank you for having me.

Jess Sloss 0:02
You're tuning in from an evening before a fun night out in Berlin. I appreciate it.

David Phelps 0:07
DAO raves? Yeah, here, here in Berlin, taking over, right?

Jess Sloss 0:13
That's appealing to the earth, the epitome of cringe. I guess it all depends on the execution.

David Phelps 0:18
What is a better model for a DAO than a rave? I'm just gonna put that out there. A bunch of lost people in the room all finding ways to somehow coordinate together.

Jess Sloss 0:27
On the weird drawing of hopium and future potential.

David Phelps 0:30
Exactly. Twitter, Twitter's or ecstasy completely completely in the database. Um, I know. Yeah.

Jess Sloss 0:36
Yeah, well, I have a number of your tweets open here that I think will be good places for us to dive in. And just, you know, I think let's start off, how are you introducing yourself David.

David Phelps 0:44
I'm David, I am co founder of JokeDAO, a governance platform for decentralized bottom up on chain governance. And I also do some other things.

Jess Sloss 0:55
Prolific thought and shit poster on Twitter, I think is how many people know you but I think increased writing the depth and breadth of your sort of thinking always come to life through through JokeDAO. So I definitely want to get into this sort of thesis you have that I think it's sort of playing out as I started see JokeDAO evolving from with some of our early conversations to I think we're yesterday and I love it, because I think it's something that most people are, you know, that miss the deeper point that you're trying to drive out if they only see either the name or even some of your NFTs, which I think it really cool. Yeah, so there's sort of like this subtle play here, which is like, introducing this thing that people are gonna be like, What the hell even is that? And then you're like spry. Yeah. Governance. Exactly.

Unknown Speaker 1:41
Exactly. Yeah. It's a Trojan horse project, for sure. Yeah.

Jess Sloss 1:44
Cool. So I thought maybe a good place for us to start would be I mean, a few weeks ago, you published a piece on not boring that was sort of diving into what I think kind of gets at, I think maybe your most recent thinking or the summation of your recent thinking on the issues with DAO governance today and a potential path forward. So maybe let's start there like, we want this to be as spicy as we possibly can, like, what is wrong in your mind with how DAO governance is operating today?

David Phelps 2:07
Yeah, sure. And again, I love pushback, too. So so feel free to interject and fight me here. And if you're playing along at home, as well, you know, to badasses on tweets could leave comments and fight me there too.

Jess Sloss 2:18
Just, send them tweets, David likes to get them up to fight.

David Phelps 2:22
So you find me, that is. You get me. So right now, the way that most governance is being done is there's a core team that is making core proposals to a community to approve them. And this is a model that very much I would say, replicates traditional shareholder capitalist governance, where there is a founding team, and they go to the board, and they say, here's what we want to do. And the board says yes or no to that. And it's not a bad model, right? It is worked well for many things. And when you have a visionary team that really needs to execute and used to make poor decisions, which is often the case of the beginning of projects, with smaller teams, this can be a really good way of proceeding. And often, you know, with, in particular with stuff like financial decisions, where you might want to just have the core team make the decisions that can make that can make sense as well, right? Like, if you think about a venture fund, you probably don't want your community making your decisions. In other words, you don't want the LPs to be the one deciding where capital is being allocated, and what to invest in as well. So this kind of model of having like a core team that goes to a community says, Here's what we propose, do you agree with that, yes or no, is effective in a certain structure. But I think it completely fails to take advantage of what is really novel with DAOs, which is the ability for communities to actually have voice and for communities themselves to be able to propose to each other in a decentralized way, what they would like to see as well. And then we can go a lot deeper on the implications of that as well. Obviously, the you know, the major issue that most people have with governance right now is one token one vote and having tokenized governance, and this has been debated mostly by Vitalik, etc. For me, personally, that is a most like a byproduct of the deeper issue, which is centralization within DAOs of core teams going to communities to submit what they want to see built. And so yeah, JokeDAO what really came out of that framework of saying, what would it look like if the community actually has voice? What if they're the ones who actually are submitting the options they want to see and then voting on each other's options in a much more decentralized way that is internet native and DAO native as well.

Jess Sloss 4:14
So even just some of the ways he framed it in the piece, which is just gonna share a few quotes here. One is just like online advertising started out as copy paste a print ads in the form of banner ads, and evolved into a richer, more sophisticated toolkit than ever could be possible offline DAO governance can and should move beyond offline models, which I think is sort of very true across so many of the things that we're building here and web three is that we're sort of inherently skeuomorphic processes. And then the rest of the question is that we don't evolve beyond that. And which I think is probably not a big risk, because you know, that these new platforms necessarily will evolve into taking advantage of these new the properties that that kind of exists there. But it's definitely sort of feels like we're in this middle zone here today. And then maybe we'll be for a little while, but I guess I'm curious to see you know, what a level of podcast is we can have these conversations with a lot more nuanced than than what exists in the written word or even on Twitter. And I think the thing that I just get so frustrated with generally about so much where the narratives is developed within in the DAO space is that it is done in these sort of like very limited ways that lack a lot of nuance. And I think even if you could sort of introduce this here, like you can hear, there's a ton of nuance in your voice. And like, there's a lot of subcategories here. And so I think that's just a helpful framing for for this conversation, because the edges of these things matter quite a bit. And I think like the idea of like, where one token, one vote, or even this sort of centralized decision making sort of come from is like, what I think is ultimately the root problem. And I don't think that JokeDAO necessarily solves this or that we have a soft loose right now, which is just vast amount of information asymmetry that exists in these communities. And so I think, like people who are putting their full effort into a thing will always have more information than people who don't. And that's not to say that people from the outside or don't have useful ideas, but I think it brings into question of like, how important is that? Can we reduce that? And like, I don't know, if we can reduce that, like, it seems like it might be a product of attention and attention is limited. But I think like separating out which I think he did it in your introduction, like, you know, maybe financial decisions are things that are sort of maybe best done by people that have the most information. But, you know, are we missing out on a whole lot of nuance and opportunity for what I think I think the true promises is bottom up organizations, it's like somebody over there who isn't deeply involved in this thing that has an immense amount of experience or a vision that could be super useful, how to make sure that they get to participate in this decision.

David Phelps 6:33
Yeah, yeah, it's it. Yeah, I actually couldn't agree more with this. So we go back to the example of the investment DAO, right? Like, what if, and, you know, a16z, had all these LPs, instead of its VCs decide what they're going to fund. So it's the people with the money who decided we're gonna fund rather than people were spending all the time doing the diligence, etc, right? This would make no sense, like the LPs don't want to do that. They also don't have that expertise. They're also not doing the diligence, they don't have that information. And the whole point of them allocating capital is not to have it. And so you look at most investment DAOs, most investment DAOs are being run exactly what that model, where's the LPs who are making the decisions, right, and unless you have a really curated group of LPs, and I would say Seed Club is actually one of the few that has this, like, unless you have a really curated group of LPs who actively are part of the ecosystem and want to be involved. Like you're actually creating an issue for yourself, because you're asking people at least information to make the most decisions, right. And this is a problem, I would say not only of having people least information, making the most decisions, but also of consensus generally, like if you prioritize for consensus, you're prioritizing failure, in some ways, the middle of the bell curve, you're prioritizing for the average reaction right within the community. And like, again, to go to investment. contrarian ism is what often has the best rewards, you might take a lot of risks, you might be wrong a lot of the time. But if 10% of the time, you're right, 100x 1,000x, you're the best investor there is, right? So you want to incentivize contrarianism, within decision making as well to be able to really get crazy experiments that probably won't work, but if they do, are immensely rewarding and valuable. And that's also what gets lost within a lot of governance, where you just optimize for the number one choice or you optimize for what the most popular thing is, and you end up with the base average of the group that actually doesn't express any of the individual's own abilities, talents, skills, etc, and thought processes and insights. Right. So I totally I totally agree that I think the flip side of this right is saying, what does it mean to have a community in which the community itself is more diverse and more informed than the core team, because actually, maybe they're the ones who actually have to deal with the product, or the outsiders, they represent the users or they're just a more diverse base that represents more diverse perspectives than the fundamental group does. And so what this really comes down to is not a question of governance, what it comes down to is curation of your community. Like fundamentally, what you're talking about is like, Do you want a community outside your core team? And who is that community? And are they adding value to it, right, and that's why, you know, to say something that's slightly controversial. Like, you know, having gatekeeping or permissioning, your community is really important, because you want to have diversity, like you really want to be able to have a really diverse group of individuals. But the other side of this is to say, like DAOs, might be better if they're five people who are just the core team, and DAOs might be better if they only are, you know, five people. And so then that's really where, you know, the article on, you know, go fork yourself is going which is to say, how do you get contrarian thinking? How do you get this kind of way in which you're not responding to consensus of a broad group? And the answer is continuous splitting into subgroups of people who have aligned interests and are smaller and use governance, not in order to decide what decision to make, that's just the front, the real purpose of governance is not figuring out what your decision is that your group makes, it's figuring out what the alignment is between people in the projects they want to build so that they can go and build those. And if you can do that, and you can find actually, like where the alignment is, you can encourage contrarian group thinking because governance is surfacing the alignment between different people to build the projects they want to build.

Jess Sloss 9:50
Okay, I love that you made a point that I was gonna make, and then I think the point that I slightly disagree with or want to dive into, so I think yeah, the point I was gonna make is that I think the issue is less about the governance process. And it is more about the curation of community, the VC investment example here, right like broad open, anybody can participate and have sort of a shared voice versus let's put like Flamingo DAO on the on the opposite side of that, right? Where they're just through timing and capital requirement, they were able to bring a really great group of human beings together that, you know, yes, there are LPs, but really they were like early believers in NFTs. And yeah, and we're done. So and, and sort of the reality of when it formed pre bull market led to this sort of structure that ultimately I think needs to be replicated by new organizations that are starting, which is to say, like, find the right people that are going to act more than just the LPs that have a, you know, alignment around this vision, and saying no, to people who don't, I think that is like, you know, so much of, you know, if you think about building useful governance structures and ownership structures, and DAOs, too many people focus on I think, the governance process, and they need to focus more on token distribution, right, so how do you actually limit some of the challenges you're gonna face? It's like, well, how do we ensure that, you know, A) that tokens are distributed broadly, those are distributed to people who we believe are incredible people who are values align, and who are going to have a lot of value here. And so what I see is for a lot of communities that they rush to put a token out, or they rush to build a membership, or they go after a number of things that they think are actually the valuable part of getting a broader membership base, but miss out on that incredibly important early stage, which is like, Okay, who should be on the bus and who shouldn't be on the bus.

David Phelps 11:27
And as voting power determined by this tier, right? Like, you know, fundamentally, we can come back to this topic, verifiable credentials are going to be a gigantic unlock for governance and being able to determine who actually contributes? Who's done the work, who's done the work in other DAOs? Who has a record that others have appreciated? And then how do we reward that accordingly, not just in, you know, terms of the power they get, but maybe the voting power that they have?

Jess Sloss 11:49
Yeah, I think that's an important topic for when you think about scaling these things. But I think the the place that I sort of feel like it's missing for the piece that you've rolled out here is, and I think he sort of hinted at is that the on chain decision is actually the last part of governance, right. And really, you know, we're talking here about the formation of a community and who comes together. And then the vast majority of decision making and discussion are actually happening off chain, right. They're happening in conversations, decentralized identity, or verifiable credentials, allow us to have social scalability and being able to identify who the right people are. But it's not a necessary starting point, right? Being thoughtful about who you admit. And when you're 20 30 40 50, that actually scales reasonably fast, at least the same scale that most successful DAOs are at right now. And then, of course, we see other examples of, you know, I think one of the things that is often overlooked in the Nouns DAO model, which I think it's maybe almost a counterpoint to, the suggestion of being like highly curated early on is the fact that it was launched by people who had a high floor price, and actually ended up being very curated. Because of that you shared a sort of a hot take seems like a nouns starter for me to think that you're actually gonna be able to build momentum and effectiveness. And 100 people want to be a part of, if there isn't some sort of curation involved early on, and that has knock on effects on the value, you're able to create the momentum, you're able to build the decisions you're able to build, etc. So I guess my my suggestion here would be like, the issues that maybe you're pushing up against are ones of scalability, and that recognizing that we can do these things, and then these things are actually being done in the smaller groups that exist right now, you know, five to 100 people and that, you know, without a doubt, it's not being done perfectly or well enough, I think in those structures. To me, that's where the focus is, or should be for right now, while also having an eye on. Okay, well, we do truly want to scale these things, which I think anybody building this space really does like this promise of broad participation. There are very obvious models that need to evolve to support that.

David Phelps 13:37
Yeah, I think there's there's two questions here. One is the role of off chain relationship building. And then the other one is the question of scalability. So let me try to break this up. So in terms of off chain relationship building, I couldn't agree more. This is something we thought about really, really deeply and try and develop JokeDAO, which is that what if it works? It's incentivizing all sorts of often collusion. Like that's, that's fundamentally what should be people should be forming their own teams in order to play this game of governance, right? And you think about, again, to hint at what I'll say, for scalability, you know, the difference between eight out of 10 people voting yes, versus 80 out of 100 people voting yes. versus you know, 800 of 1000 is how well they were able to coordinate with each other, in making that vote, eight out of 10 people is very likely they talked all to each other, 80 out of 100 probably means a bunch of subgroups that all talk to each other, right? 8000 out of 10000 ,aybe nobody talks to each other, it's really hard to coordinate it that kind of level, you actually get less coordination and the bigger you get often and so to step back for a sec, like game I love is Settlers of Catan and one reason I really love this game is because there's an on chain and off chain component to it. So the on chain component is that you can always trade your sheep or your wheat for a set amount to the bank, right and so there's this fixed rate that you can get for trading in for each other but there's also an option component which is you can start to build relationships and alliances with other players in the team and see if they're gonna lend you wheat or you know, sheep and you can arbitrage to the bank right to See if you can get a better deal based on the relationships you're building and based on how well you're doing and like based on how others are, and then, you know, really advanced players of Catan, they'll start trading futures, they'll make promises to each other about how they'll help each other down the line, etc. And so this is incredible game of collusion, where you can have this entire option relationship building piece, pluses on chain, and then there's the final metal layer of playing Settlers of Catan, which is, when you play games against each other, you build better relationships with each other, right? Like the way often we become really good friends with each other. And we trust each other is by betraying each other within these, like closed set circuits, which we know are a game, right. And as long as we have a safe space for that chaos, and to know that we're all going to our goal is to betray each other, we actually end up with like deeper trust for one another outside of that. And so the question is, like, how can you model governance to be a game in that in that way, and so this is not what the piece is on. This is, you know, maybe what, what a future piece will be on. But I do think like gamifying governance is so, so important. And so to show myself for a second, you know, a really good example, this was like rehash, which is JokeDAO in order to nominate who they wanted to appear on a podcast, right. And so the token holders, were able to submit the people that they wanted, and then vote on the people they wanted. And we ended up happening was everyone had 14 votes to give. And so the people who had been submitted, were going on social media and saying, vote for me, or they're saying, Don't vote for me vote for someone else. So you start getting this attentional piece to it, right, where everyone's competing on Twitter. And of course, like, ultimately, the goal right now always is bringing Twitter because that's where intentional games happen. No one likes it, but it's true. And so you start having this intentional game being played where people are, you know, getting attention about the podcast, because they are sharing it with each other and promoting themselves. And then they're trying to play a strategy game. And they're trying to figure out, you know, how do I allocate these points? Because if I put all these points towards the person I want, I might be wasting them if no one else is also going to support that option, right? So maybe I should put those votes towards like someone I think is going to be nominated. But if they think they're going to be nominated, why would I bother, right? And so everyone starts having these like, questions of how do I play this game of governance, so then they start working together, and they say, look, I really want to support this speaker, but I don't know they're gonna have enough votes, will you work with me as well, in order to back this person, and they have to form these relationships with one another. In order to actually do this, you get these two pieces that are happening, and one is the attentional piece, where they're playing the game publicly a vote for me right and public campaigning. And there's the private campaigning. And the private campaigning is this relationship building to say, like, you know what, I'll give up some of my points for your choice if you give them some for mine. And we can get both of ours in as well. And this is sort of, you know, like gameplan collaboration that actually builds more meaningful relationships. And I think this is important, because like, as we know, DAOs have retention problem, it's very easy to get people in DAOs, it's very hard to get them to stay. And so getting games that they can play is important, that are fun, making governance actually enjoyable, it's fun, but also giving them a way to build relationships with one another is going to lead to much more lasting relationship within the DAO itself. And the final piece is, once they're discussing these options with each other and saying, here's why you should vote for this person, here's why you should trade your votes, here's why you should collaborate with me, here's why you should form a team, they're getting more excited about those options that they're actually voting for. And so ultimately, you have a higher chance of success of that option doing well, because you actually have people who have built excitement around it, and are all getting nervous in the final seconds of the game that it's going to pass. Right? And so like absolutely, like as much as possible, the on chain element is only there to incentivize off chain relationship building. And that that's a core piece of DAOs. Right? Is all those things that cannot happen on chain. And so the on chain just has to be those rules of the game, then incentivize everyone to start forming this other issue is the scalability we can come back to in a sec. But yeah, I really think it's part of the premise for forking is keep I actually am against scalability and would say it's much more interesting to build diversified projects of different sub DAOs, that all might even sort of compete or coordinate or collaborate for a token, but each pursuing their own projects. And then again, governance is job is to surface the alignments between those different groups as well.

Jess Sloss 18:49
Yeah, I want to get into forking, but I think that your first one I think is worth sort of diving into. And I think that is like one of the most difficult things for me as a operator and attempted educator in the space is being able to sort of like truly observe the way I actually interact in these. I don't have a lot of information asymmetry, right. Like I like a lot more information just because I'm in it. And I think the thing that most people miss when they look at DAOs from the outside is this game that has been played within these communities to actually figure out what to work on how to approach things, decisions to be made. I think that's just a really great point to underline for people who have not been in and it's not even just a matter of being in, So being in and being active and being known that there's actually a bunch of barriers to probably being able to play.

David Phelps 19:30
You are a politician. When you're in a DAO, you're a politician. Yeah, you're playing the game of politics.

Jess Sloss 19:35
Yeah. And it's not just within your DAO, it's with all these other different I mean, the great online game, it's like a really great framing for this stuff, right? Because it takes so many different. No, there's the social capital, you're managing on Twitter, there's the private relationships that you're building in telegram and at conferences. There's the co working and co creation and building of things. And each of those decisions is actually building towards the shape of this network that you're building. At least that's how I think about it within Seed Club is that you know, there's So many different decisions that are being made that are both trying to be optimized for impact in the short term, but also position the organization for the long term. And the engagement with our engaged contributors and community members really helped to shape that. What I'm hearing from you here is sort of like this reshaping of like, well, how do we go do that in a more accessible and a better way? And I think what I see with the rehashed example is for rather clear outcomes, should I choose this person or this person? That's probably a great starting point. Right, and it can be done. The challenge is that I think that that rarely is the most valuable types of decisions, right? And so to me, I almost worry that, you know, it's almost like how do you get more contributors? So you put up a bounty and we'll get it the challenge with bounties are, you have to really define narrowly, and they actually don't create as much value. That's why they're.

David Phelps 20:41
The mercenary, right? Yeah.

Jess Sloss 20:43
Exactly. And so then you get into this, like, yes, rank choice voting is very useful when they're sort of clear, discrete options that exist. But that is like the absolute minority of decisions that are being made. It isn't such an interesting question to explore, like, how do we actually serve as more information, provide more participation, involve more people? And maybe for me here, the realization is like, maybe just even talking about it and identifying it as a thing makes it a little bit more legible and can increase participation. But yeah, to sort of see what you're doing it JokeDAO and maybe actually is probably worthwhile just describing a JokeDAO here, because we've talked about it for about 20 minutes without actually saying that structure actually being useful in like the more nuanced, detailed sort of tough conversations and decisions that it does have to make.

David Phelps 21:25
Yeah, great question. So yeah, let me briefly describe a trick that does, it's really simple. There's a submission period, where community can submit options in response to a prompt, and there's a voting period where community can vote on them, you can actually divide these up so you can have separate people submit from the people who vote. So you can say, giving away some alpha, but like one thing we've talked about is like whitehat hackers for Nomad, maybe they can submit themselves in order receive a bounty by saying how they're going to contribute your community. So they could go and say, we can have a contest and say, how are you going to contribute to Seed Club, those white hat hackers could all be allowed listed, and they could submit and say, here's how I'm going to contribute to Seed Club, Seed Club, voters can then vote on them and say, here's what we want to let in and give an allocation of club tokens to that simple submission period, and then a voting period, that's all. And so you can imagine you can use this thing. You can use this for grants proposals. If people want to submit different grants for something, you can use it for curation, what was your favorite film of the festival? You could do that you could use it for content creators to say, what do you want me to write on for my next podcast? What sort of videos do you want me to make? And then your super fans will buy up a lot of your token, in order to have extra votes right on the kind of content you produce. And meanwhile, you're also getting a record even of the losing options of other content you might want to create. You can use it for user generated roadmaps, where you can say what features do you want us to build? And then your community can say, here's the features we really need to see. And then rank choice voting, get a list of the prioritization of what matters, most of them. You can use it for hackathons to say what should we build? Awesome, griffiths did this with us and a really great one. You can use it for any sort of contests, endorsements bounties, the list goes on. The question here is like, we talked before about the importance of submissions, and having community voice and how they submit. Now the question is the voting piece, like, you know, rank choice voting? How valuable is it? I think there's, there's a couple things I'd say here. One is that being able to prioritize what your community feels is really important in order to have a sense of relative passion. So let me give an example. Like if you have a grants process, and you have five different projects that want to get a grant from Seed Club, let's say if you do an traditional vote where it's a yes or no vote, each one of those will go to a yes or no vote, it'll be public, people probably feel a lot of pressures, or their friends that want to say yes, likely, and Seed Club will probably have to give the same level of grant to each one of these five projects. If they all submitted to the same contest and said, here's why we should receive your grant. And then everyone went and voted on their favorite options. In that case, you would have a much better sense of the passion of your community for these projects relative to each other, in being able to see which ones they prefer. And there also be a lot less social pressure, because they wouldn't feel like they had to vote yes, for everything, when already the default is they're gonna be voting no, for most of those, they can just support their favorites, right? And then what's cool is like, you could even take the money you have, and you could distribute that proportionately to the votes they got, as well, that's, you know, like a simple use case for the value of rank choice voting. The bigger question is like, how is this relevant when you do have so many typical decisions that need to be made? And the question is, do we do this? Or do we not do this? And I actually think there's a huge piece of governance is missing from those decisions. And that piece of governance is missing is being able to find the best version of that proposal before putting it to a yes or no vote. And so that's where we become really helpful right? It is like to take a recent example, like Lido has been trying to figure out how do we diversify our treasury? And so originally, they talked about we're gonna get 1% to dragonfly and no lockup period, and there's a lot of pushback, right? They said, What do you mean no lockup period, they're just gonna get tokens, they can immediately sell it. And so then they added another option to say yeah, we also you can also vote for lockup period and you can also vote no, and this of course means that like the Yes, voters are split into two camps, but you also have a lot of people who want different terms they want maybe, you know, a different allocation that's given or they want different period terms to the lockup, right? As well. And so it didn't pass in the light. I said, Okay, we're gonna go back, we're gonna try another option for you guys. And so they're guessing in the dark as to what our community wants based on the feedback they're getting in forums, if they've done this with us, right, they've gone through and they said, here's our version of the proposal. Now you submit your version of it, you would have had people from the community copy, paste that proposal, and they would have changed the details, they would have said, Okay, we've extended the lockup, we extend the team, and then they can campaign with each other, they can form relationships, that you will find the best version of that proposal from the community. And this is nice, because the core team is still the one that is saying, We're the ones with the information, we want to do this thing. But fundamentally, the community is being able to evolve and say, okay, but we're actually going to change the details. So many ways, like, you know, JokeDAO is not like a competitive snapshot, because you do ultimately want whatever that winning proposal is to go to, yes, no vote, right? What is what's the competitor to is forums, because you fundamentally are getting a lot better insight on like, what the best version is of that proposal, while incentivizing people to build relationships with each other. So yeah, I do think there's always a use case for this, even in the case of yes, no votes.

Jess Sloss 26:03
Yeah, that's interesting. I sort of like the, again, a theme here sort of nuance and being able to see how governance that is not, like right now governance is very focused on the outcome that will drive a transaction on chain. And what you're suggesting here is actually like, okay, there's some legibility we can bring to this process that benefits from some of the certainty that an on chain vote has right and that there's people are very strongly indicating the preferences, as opposed to you know, forums where they're sort of like a messy evolution and actually quite a high burden for people to actually pay attention enough to it and follow those ends, until you're almost suggesting, here's this place for us to go. And let's do this offline, off chain collaboration, let's create a space where we can have multiple different options sort of emerge. And at that place, right, there's actually where the broader community can engage, you know, if they wanted to be involved in shaping those opinions, that can be in the forums. But if they want to be involved in helping to choose from the numerous shaped opinions, this is actually a much more straightforward way for them to do that. And you probably will result in a higher cert participation in governance, higher conviction around the ultimate outcomes and a whole lot of other information and insight that is, you know, as somebody who's deeply involved in these things that I would really want, right, I think like being able to get hard numbers or preferences indicated, yeah, okay. Yep. Super interesting.

David Phelps 27:16
And arrive at the best version, because ultimately Lido will put a version forward, maybe they did, I've lost track of this, right? This is yes. But that might not be the best possible version that the most people would have supported, right?

Jess Sloss 27:26
And I think there is, you know, one of the big changes we met at Seed Club as far as how our teams are operating, so we're really leaning in more into sort of narratives. And we're big decisions are being made through the co-creation of a narrative, there's a lot of feedback and comments and sort of shaping. So the reason for that is two fold one is context matters quite a bit, and it gets lost cross multiple, different touchpoints, and conversations, etc. And doesn't even carry through in most proposals. The other thing is having this track record or a record of those decisions, and sort of allowing for anybody who comes into an organization later to be able to see, okay, what got us here? Yeah, why? Yeah, what is sort of the evolution of this thing? I think that's a big missing piece that honestly, I feel even even in using narratives that I think is like, potentially a really good outcome from from a JokeDAO type system, especially using this middle ground between forum and snapshot.

David Phelps 28:14
That's yeah, so so I'm really glad you brought that up. Because, you know, the touted benefit of on chain voting is that you can have executable transactions, right? We vote who's going to get 5000 Club tokens, and we vote Justin's gonna get 5000 Club tokens, and then you automatically get it based on the results of that vote, or we say, what kind of, you know, NFT? Do we want to mint, people submit different options, and the winning options is minted as an NFT. And this is very cool. Like, it's very cool that you no longer have to do this manually. And that, you know, web three, in many ways is like a next version of no code, where you just automatically are doing all these things that would have taken time before and it governance is doing it. And then, you know, the most extreme event, you know, version of that is like governance for another one, where it's like, we're going to upgrade our entire system, you know, we're going to change over to a new form of staking, like, we're gonna actually fork this and start our own app chain, you know, whatever version of that is, or we're gonna declare this transaction invalid, right on our chain. So that kind of on chain governance is very much the future, I think. And it's very powerful, especially with upgrading systems. And replacing settlement layers is really fascinating. But there's a much simpler real advantage of the on chain voting. And it's exactly what you brought up, which is you've now have all this data that's out there that anyone can assemble and analyze and interpret as they want. Similar to what we've seen with doing dashboards, just being able to take all this on chain data and have anybody be able to crank out numbers to say, here's what we think of it right? Like this is an incredible unlock for DAOs. Because when we talk about go fork yourself, I think the the interpretation within that piece is let's say that people are voting on what they want. The next project to be for DAO. And option number seven is far from the winner. But you notice that everyone who voted for it was unique. They didn't vote for any other options, so they had full conviction on this. You notice that the people they had many more voters, but they didn't have that many tokens, right. And you notice that those people all tend to vote for the same things over time. Now you have some data to be able to say, like from on chain data to say, Okay, there's a lot of alignment and a lot of concerning passion here. If I'm running this down, maybe I actually really do want to give a grant to them, because they're expressing real passion here, right that I want to reward. So that's one benefit of like on chain data. But another really, really interesting one is to say, the whole idea of who your number one winner is, depends on the metrics you have used for your contest. And so that changes as well, depending on how you interpret the data, if you retro actively go back and apply quadratic funding, or you'd apply vote decay, or you apply different metrics for the voting power based in the verifiable credentials of the users hold, you're gonna come up with a totally different list of who the top voted option was. And so you can actually afford where it's based on people having totally different reputations of who won the contest. And you could have, you know, six months later, say, you know, I don't agree with your system of governance itself, and your metrics that you use, let me do another version of that. And that's where it gets really cool. Because again, this is all just permissionless data, like governance just surfaces, the data, but then others can decide what they want to do with it and how they interpret it and what it means to them as well. So I think yeah, that's that's just like an incredible, incredible unlock for for on chain data.

Jess Sloss 31:16
People sort of think about web three, or crypto or blockchain is this idea of immutability of decisions, everything being written on chain, I think is over indexed upon. And the reality is, there's so much more social consensus that goes into all that sort of stuff like Bitcoin is valuable, not because of the fact that not only on a blockchain is valuable, because people believe is valuable and will be valuable and will maintain its value. And that exists at every single level of this space. Really Sure, there are other dynamics that play into that. But I think one of the early insights and its ethos that is actually the core thing, right? So when we say, value flows to community on web three, it's this belief in that there's sort of a social consensus or capital is actually the thing that actually the lower order, you know, infrastructure tools actually gain your value from. And so what if we sort of looked at that as actually being a prime focus, I think that's interesting. And what you're saying here is that there's like these a whole host of you know, as we build this data set, there's actually a lot of nuance that emerges there. And you can almost imagine a thing that sort of started to slowly build steam, but then, you know, 6 10 or a year later, you sort of end up in this place where something's not working, or at least new options are being raised up. And you can go back and see that sort of evolution of preference, and almost like recalculate or re orient your direction based on preference data, rather than just maybe the immediate challenge at hand. But I think there's interesting nuances that can kind of start to come out of that. And, you know, I think one of my broad concerns with this idea for stability, I think, is maybe less than by looking at it through that lens, which I think you know, your the posts he put out, I think really was advocating for the value of these certain smaller and more focused teams emerging. And I think you sort of addressed some of the challenges that were associated with it, but I didn't feel like he kind of gave it enough prominence in the piece, because I think those challenges are actually potentially existential for DAOs. I think that we can get into that. But when I look at it through this lens of thinking, Okay, well, we're building preference data over time. And social consensus is that what we're ultimately building, and there may be times in the future where we really need to make specific changes and having a whole lot of understanding of what where we've come from, and where these various opinions are, that gets really interesting to me, because to me, you know, forking is is a major decision, whether you're talking about a blockchain or a community, because you're sort of fragmented liquidity, talent, brand capital, all these things are actually extremely difficult to actually build, and you start to sort of, in many cases, weakened your ability to actually leverage those superpowers. But I think what I was missing in my thinking is that there's ultimately optionality and DAOs I think it's just absolutely essential. The world that we live in today is not the ultimate end state of this, like, we can all agree with that. And so how are we actually building such that we give ourselves more optionality? And it seems as if that's the thread you're pulling out here, more than like, this specific desire for more of these communities to fork.

David Phelps 33:48
Yeah, yeah, that's that's exactly if I mean, one thing to say here is we use the term forking really loosely in this piece. So your point, right? That like forking, traditionally would fragment liquidity and capital is true. But one thing we're also trying to imagine that pieces like, what if it weren't like, like, what if forking meant that you have two versions of a DAO that each have the same token, and fundamentally, the main version says, you know, what, you guys are all contrarian, you have a separate vision of this thing. But instead of having you go off, and just leave us and form your own thing, we're gonna give you a grant from our own token, because, frankly, we don't agree with you. But we think that, you know, we want to diversify our options, and we respect the your commitment and your courage and your conviction. And so we're gonna give you a grant of our own token, and you're gonna build your project. But it's also if it is successful, it will accrue value to our token as well. Right? And so this is like a whole new model where in Web2, you would always just optimize for the success of the project itself, right? And then the stock price is a reflection of that. But in web three, you can have a token being used by multiple projects. The most exciting one, I think right now is I can layer where you can restake ETH for all sorts of new services, right? And so fundamentally, like if this takes off, you can have one toe can be used by multiple projects. And it serves as a grant for them to get them off the ground and running and then also eventually will accrue value back to the token to. And so like, yeah, being it being able to actually use forking to to aggregate liquidity. I think it's really exciting to, now with that set to good to go to the point of like, traditional forking and what we traditionally mean by that where we are very much breaking it fragmenting into different blockchains with different currencies. Yeah, that's essentially a social consensus experiment, right? I think one of the greatest things that ever happened to this space was the DAO hack. And I think it's one of the great things because it proved your point, which is that no, immutability is bullshit, what matters is social consensus, like you now have when the DAO hack happened, they had a fork Ethereum and now have two versions of this blockchain. And there's a Ethereum classic, and there's Ethereum, which one is going to work and which one are people going to believe in just a matter of social consensus, it depends which version they support. So part of the point of forking is also that most forks will die. And that's okay. Because you're fundamentally are trying to diversify your options and see which one will take off. And you can't do that without a lot of risk for a lot of reward. And so you know, if you can create this kind of diversified system, where people are still somewhat protected, because they're using the same token, or because they have backing of each other, then you have this much more like evolutionary kind of biodiversity, we have different versions of the same species that can potentially all flourish, but there will also be a lot that will die because they can't, they can't survive. But that's, that's okay, within the system you build. And the final thing to say is like, part of the reason this is hard for I think all of us to understand, is because forking cannot work within physical reality, like, fundamentally a nation state cannot easily be forked. And even now, forking, as you said, is very, very difficult for blockchains. too. It's a lot of work, it's a lot of capital. But the main work requires a social consensus. And I think what's really exciting with stuff like swasthya, building a single data availability layer that anyone can build apps on top of, and you know, someone tweeted this a few days ago is you could fork the app, and it has the same level of shared security underneath. And so its success now is only dependent on social consensus, you no longer worrying about these other pieces that you've just like worried about with forking, this is really, really what we mean by like internet native governance.

Jess Sloss 37:05
I love that phrasing. And again, like why I love this format is because I think there's some obvious nuance to your argument that I missed in that document. And I think what this leads me to think about a lot is what are we trying to build here with DAOs, right, and the first one we're thinking is like, Oh, we're gonna go build a product, right, we're gonna come together, we're gonna go make a thing. But in my mind, at least how we think about Seed Club is actually the network is the core product that we're building, right. And that network might have an RC does, you know, like many different groups that are creating value for that network. So that might be an or accelerator team or game plans we have around media or, or even a product that we might spin out. So in my mind, it's very clear that those things sort of live in this constellation that are ultimately trying to create value and derive value from this network. What I hadn't considered though, which is I think the core point you're making is that almost maximizing we're designing processes that really encourage for either for some of those are different versions of those you can imagine almost like our accelerator program, somebody having an insight saying, hey, I want to go do one for this specific idea, right? Maybe it's a DeScience specific accelerator, a brand of CLUB tokens, and some capital that goes towards standing that up, allowing us to congregate, the smartest people that are already in our community go do that sort of thing. It's very much, you know, a thought that we have around like, how do we start to scale what we're doing. And I think that sort of the separation, or at least sort of more, more niche groups make make a ton of sense. At a certain point. I think it's actually more broad than that, right? Like, there's always other ideas, like to me that the thing that I worry about is that we miss out on some great idea that somebody has that if we just heard it, saw their talent and empower them with capital, that they would go build this incredible other sort of node in the network that just hasn't even remotely come across our brain. And I think so they're sort of like this social or is not just product, not just working groups, not just these engines that we are building collectively right now. But it's also like, how do we create the spaces for these new ideas to actually be tested and developed through actual execution that could potentially be like the center of the thing, right, and it creates this pathway where you sort of compare to networks versus corporations, you kind of get into this, like corporations or businesses feel very stodgy. And it feels very much brick and mortar, and it kind of this thing that can't evolve quite as much. And innovation actually can be challenging within these structures. But you know, really leaning into the benefits of many small bets and leaning into new ideas and empowering individual traders through ownership. To me that feels very evolutionary, very innovation focused and could make these types of organizations be a heck of a lot, but maybe truly anti fragile, right, and that corporations maybe are fragile based on getting to know the innovators dilemma.

David Phelps 39:32
This is not something I've thought about before but you're you're making me think that there's kind of a tension within the space on the one hand of network effects having this aggregated value accrual, where each new entrant in the system is adding value to all the other pieces in the system as well. Right? So Cosmos is like the best example of this right now. Like ETH was the best example probably like two years ago where you know, each new DeFi protocol they came along. Yeah, they're competing with each other, but essentially You can start, you know, dig out a flash loan on Aave using Uniswap to buy something right all within transaction like this is incredible composability where one DeFi protocols adding value to another DeFi protocol. But existing the same system today, I think you see this a lot with Cosmos, where the more Cosmos chains are offering Energy and Security to each other, the more value they're also all getting. And the safer the entire system becomes for more interested in come in to encourage more entrants to come in as well as entire blockchains. And so we continually see this within Web three, that you have these network effects where all the different entrants are adding value to one another. And it's really, really incredible way. The question then is like, Why does everyone need their own token? Fundamentally, we assume everyone needs their own token, because they're starting their own project where they want to have value for themselves. We've also found it's very hard to get value for a token, both Uniswap and Aave right? Have this challenge. And as does anyone who wants to start a token, like, why does it have value? What does it represent, especially when you add in securities laws, and the fact that it can't stand for return of value in the United States, like, it becomes very hard to defend token, as you know, some sort of like as having financial value. And so I do wonder if we're going to move to this place, and this is kind of eigen layers thesis, right? That you will not only have this accrual of value within this networks, but that value accrual, maybe to one token that can be used by all of these as well, and that they can take as fees as well. And so that's much more Web2 kind of models saying, look, there's one currency we use, and we just take a cut of it. But it also makes a lot of sense that that currency is something like ETH, or Atom, or what the case may be, the flip side of that is to say, everyone's gonna want their own token, because if you do these sub projects, like the creators, you know, like, adult content creators is what kind of video do you want me to make? You know, they're super fans gonna buy a lot of this and give them a lot of value in that way. So there are ways that non financial use cases for tokens, like governance can drive value to them. But you're making me wonder, you know, is there is there a tension here, where we're seeing value accrual to networks, and therefore, that should be the network token that is receiving the value?

Jess Sloss 42:03
Yeah, interesting. I mean, I think like, there's gonna be networks of different scale that, you know, they can exist, right. And I think they small communities are networks as our large infrastructure projects. I think that's a separate thought from what is the right token or financial structure that existed and I think like, the biggest insight that people should have around tokenomics, generally, is that you just don't know. Like, listen, like honestly say, I just don't know. And so we can have.

David Phelps 42:29
Insight is we don't have insight.

Jess Sloss 42:30
Insight, right? There's a number of insights that are out there doing stuff, but we can't say any one wins with certainty, maybe, you know, maybe proof of work works, right. But again, it's very limited things. So how do we actually grow the space and have new innovative things come out. And I think that starting from that point is the right point to start out, because it allows us to be a lot more, you know, we are at the beginning of the idea maze, not further down it. And so we should be running multiple different experiments and, you know, ultimately seeing seeing what works and what works for specific examples. So to me, that is the big thing, like the two big open questions, how do we coordinate as human beings and increasing scale? It's still tough to figure out in DAOs, like, what is the actual right economic or network economy model to be building for? Right. I think there are insights that are but definitely no certainty. And we need more evolution there.

David Phelps 43:16
Again, like Web2 is not a failed experiment. And corporations are not a failed experiment. They're quite successful at what they've done. And so like, if we want DAOs, and we want web three to win, and whatever that means, I think it needs because it has to do something that's different from what a corporation could ever do. And because otherwise, just start a company, like that still has a great future ahead of it. And so yeah, these are the kinds of things that companies can't do, they can't have these composable network effects that you know, accrue value due to a token, they also can't, you know, have individuals creating their own token, as well. And so yeah, it can go both these directions. But I do think we're really what we're pointing to is like, what we really want to unlock here is what you could not do in a traditional corporation, and very much, yeah, being able to have shared security among a shared token across multiple projects. That's just something that would never would happen in Web2. And is very, very exciting.

Jess Sloss 44:08
Totally agree. There's sort of the another piece that they sort of explored. Can we go at an entire episode without mentioning Nouns DAO? Probably not. So let's just like dive in here, because I think it actually adds another layer of nuance to the sort of workability idea, which is, instead of thinking about the financial layer as being forward, what we're actually seeing is the intellectual property are the main layer being for police being composable and built upon Yeah, and yeah, I'm sort of curious, like, what are the insights you see from Nouns that are maybe related to our conversation here?

David Phelps 44:38
Yeah, there's there's a lot of things that Nouns does really impressively, one is recurring attention. You just can't emphasize how much how important attention is in web three. First of all, it happens on Twitter. Second of all, tokens are actual medium of attention. People pay attention to prices, and so it draws people and it gets them there, but also because everyone else is competing for attention and building thing is happening so quickly and so accelerated that you need to draw people in. And so like the fact that Nouns has recurring attention by continuing day in day out to do this, I think is insight one, I think insight too, is that instead of releasing 10,000 NFTs all at once and then waiting for the price to go up over time, they capture the maximum that anyone is willing to pay for an NFT every single day. And so that means that like, traditionally, a content creator would get 5% of the maximum people are willing to pay Nouns is getting 100%, because they play with temporal scarcity. And they're willing to wait, right? But I think that the thing that I'm most interested in, in Nouns, and that probably relates most of this conversation is that they flipped the venture capital model on its head, the venture capital model is to say, we need to invest in each of these projects with our own token, because each one of these projects needs to prove value, right? If we invested in something that just gave value to ETH, like, why would we do it? That's a public good, like, yeah, we invested in ETH, as well, and it's nice, but someone else could also invest in that, like no venture capitalist would say, we're just gonna invest in things that give value to EHT, without taking value for itself, right? Although, again, this is a big question at in-layer. And so Nouns flips this on its head, and Nouns says, No, we're gonna invest in things that have no value of their own, because they add more value to our token, which is the Nouns token. And fundamentally, these are public goods projects within the public space that we have created of Nouns itself. And I think this is just like, again, that kind of web three insight that just is so counterintuitive to anyone who's ever worked in venture capital or Web2, that could only happen in this kind of space, to say, actually, the most value cruel will happen if you invest in public goods, that give back to the fundamental token that we're trying to optimize for, which is this one thing, which is Nouns. Now, from there, of course, that means that they have essentially a venture capital fund to allocate to different projects that are not expected to make money, but that will give value back to their core project. And that value is not just financial, it's it's social, but of course, as a flywheel between these things, and drawing more attention to the project, and getting it seen more and having more people join the community, and having more people take part, right, and just raising awareness and attention and just like making it cool. And so that's really worth it to them as well. And in keeping the fundamental project going. And it's a huge bet, I think that they're making in this kind of model of venture capital, when you think of Nouns as a VC fund. The other question, right, with Nouns that really started talk is, is it the best model to just have the people who have all this money to buy a Nouns and make the decisions? I really do wish they had more models for contrarian decision making based on the passionate participants rather than putting everything to a vote where delegates often are making the decisions. That's something I expect to also figure out. It's also the other question is just scale, as you brought up over and over, you know, 50 Nouns members coordinating to make decisions is very different from 200 is very different from 500. And this is going to be another thing that's challenging for them to figure out. But the reason it's challenging is because at the forefront of all this and totally at the vanguard and these kinds of issues that it's it's extremely impressive to watch.

Jess Sloss 47:55
Yeah, I think I'm very interested in Nouns. And it's really evolution experiments are running there, what I'm most interested in seeing what the next order effects are, like, what do new teams or other teams do with the insights that have been generated? And where else can this be applied? Because I think my guess is we're gonna see a whole lot of failed experiments here, because people are sort of not fully understanding the dynamics that went into the creation of Nouns. And I think they hit on so many things very, very well. But I think from a distribution standpoint, capital accumulation standpoint, and probably a coordination standpoint, and other sort of smaller groups of people that are making these decisions. And this broader like, thinking about the value of a meme in web three, generally, those things I think, are really important. And we're gonna see some teams do novel interesting things with them. I don't think we've seen that yet, in my opinion, or at least I haven't seen it yet. But I expect to. And so that's the thing that I'm really, really watching for in that space.

David Phelps 48:47
I think is a great insight also, that Nouns is very deliberately a meme token. And, and part of its insight is that tokens are memes, like tokens are things that you spread in order to raise awareness about themselves. And like, fundamentally, they're like, Let's make something that we can, the more we mean that the more this is worth. And so that's that very, very important insight, yeah.

Jess Sloss 49:09
And interesting posts that I'm thinking about is sort of like the evolution. So we talked about token economics, like the evolution of where we think value will live in tokens, and maybe went from like, proof of work proof of stakes or infrastructure layer to utility tokens were a thing and maybe they're still a thing, but maybe they're not a thing to governance tokens. And I think like the current thinking right now, or at least where people I think we'll get to is that actually these things are memes, right? And so like only a part of the brand, or the meme or of the sort of their thing that you think about Coca Cola and the value of their brand versus the value of like the sugar water they put out like so much of what people are buying when they're buying equity in Coca Cola is this brand and I think that is also very clear in why people buy governance tokens, you know, Uniswap versus SushiSwap.There's a theme made there and I think Nouns just says actually, this is the thing. Let's go see what it looks like when we say this is the thing and what we can go create around it. And I think that's a big insight. definitely has shaped my thinking around, you know, I think it plays very well into the thesis we have at Seed Club around membership and collectability. And these core aspects of being the things that breathe value into a community and give resources and social and financial capital to be able to build towards their big adventure. And I think it's also a thing, it's very easy to dismiss unless you are experiencing it. So I think there's actually a lot alpha in that insight right now from the more sort of discounted cash flow predictions of if Uniswap turns on a fee in the future, just feel so much less interesting, then Uniswap as the meme of like the free exchange of value on the internet, and wanting to have a piece of that, and then leads to the question of okay, what is the right token model and token distribution model, and I think Nouns is more correct than Uniswap in their in their process right now to capture that value. But again, with a bunch of challenges that are so sort of associated on it. We've been yammering off for an hour, I absolutely love this conversation. They try to make it spicy, but I don't think we're ever really capable of making it too spicy, David, because I think we see the world slightly differently, but with the exact same starting point and intent and belief in the space. And so hopefully that leads to an interesting conversation. One of the big open questions I have and I'm sure some of our listeners will have is like how the heck do I actually get involved in JokeDAO? Do I need to go buy one of these cheesy ass memes that you keep sharing on the internet? And is that the way to get in? Like what make it very clear for people who are listening to your brilliance here and wanting to be involved in this world that you're creating?

David Phelps 51:23
Yeah, best thing to do would be to join our telegram. There's a link to that in our Twitter bio, it's @JokeDAO_ is the Twitter one thing specifies JokeDAO's two entities. One is the joke race. The joke race is a weekly contest that we do for jokes based on different themes. The winner is never the number one option, it's often number two, number three, and then that's mint as an NFT sold 20% goes charity 20% goes to the submitter, which means that they're actually getting like 500$ a week, which is amazing. And then 60% goes to the Joke race DAO itself of NFT holders. And if this sounds familiar to you, it is very much Nouns fork, so I asked when I acknowledge like Nouns is very much an inspiration for this, in which we took the idea. And I'd say, like the innovation was making the user generated NFT collection. So you get wonderful, cheesy NFT is every week, you can buy very, very cheesy one day there'll be a good joke, the other entity is JokeDAO itself, which has the joke token to represent it right now, the joke token is used primarily in joke races, to voting your favorite entries, it will have other uses. For example, when we go to the community say, What do you want us to build next? What do you prioritize what's the most important things for us to build, right? And we'll be able to use our own platform to actually bring the community in more to make those decisions, or help us make those decisions too, and giving us feedback and user insight. And so you have these different options, you can buy joke tokens, at Uniswap. You can buy the NFT. There's one per week right now, that I think is one out for 1.69 ETH. But I would say like if you just want to be involved, just join the telegram or shoot a DM to the JokeDAO Twitter. And yeah, always, always glad to have more people in the community.

Jess Sloss 52:50
Awesome. I very much appreciate your hot takes on Twitter, I think you did an incredible job of sort of playing that Twitter game. But I gotta say, watching you step into building and leading a project here where you're sort of able to take those insights. And actually, you're really making a commitment to building the world that you think needs to exist. To me, that's the thing that is most inspiring about how you carry yourself in the space. And so I'm very excited to see you like leaning in full force here.

David Phelps 53:16
Wonderful spicy takes but like, I mean, we know in the end, just like your strength is that you're a connector, like you're just a masterful connector. And that's why you're a great DAO leader because you connect everyone else within that network to connect with each other and create this p2p kind of connections even within Seed Club. And that's rare and that's really special. But yeah, let me just share that that right back at you.

Jess Sloss 53:34
I appreciate it. Well, awesome, man. Appreciate the time. Yeah, I really enjoyed this conversation. These are the types of things that make me really excited to be able to. I mean, this is the superpower of a podcast is just being able to have an hour of somebody's time right before they go to a DAO rave to come talk about esoteric governance etc. so.

David Phelps 53:50
Yeah, this is the pre game shoot.

Jess Sloss 53:52
I appreciate it.

David Phelps 53:55
Thank you.